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SHOOING THE VULTURES AWAY FROM 
THE CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY CARCASS: 
ATTORNEY FEES OWED BY DEBTORS FOR 
MARITAL DISSOLUTION ARE NOT 
DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
 
CHRISTOPHER V. DAVIS 
 
“[The] fundamental dilemma of bankruptcy law has always 
been whether it is about death or rebirth. Is it a system for 
picking a debtor's bones in a more orderly fashion? Or is it 
an economic and social safety net that allows debtors to 
return to the world? The fact that it is both has never slowed 




A goal of modern American consumer bankruptcy is to 
give “the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a clear field for 
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of pre-existing debt”2 – a fresh start – by 
discharging the debtor from personal liability on prepetition 
debts. A bankruptcy discharge permanently enjoins 
prepetition claimants from pursuing the debtor to satisfy their 
claims.3 But there are exceptions to this general rule.4 One 
such exception has been for support obligations owed to the 
debtor’s spouse and children.5 The fresh start policy is clearly 
subordinate to a more compelling interest in maintaining the 
 
 The author is an attorney and a December 2009 graduate of the 
Southern New England School of Law, North Dartmouth, Massachusetts. 
1 BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE 
OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 255 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002). 
2 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(a)(1)–(2) (2009). 
4 E.g., 11 U.S.C §§ 523(a)(1)–(19) (2009). 
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), (a)(15) (2009). 
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financial support of family members.6 The enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005 (BAPCPA)7 created a new term for this type of non-
dischargeable debt: Domestic Support Obligations (DSOs).8 
As a general rule, debts, including attorney fees, are 
dischargeable in consumer bankruptcy.9 Before the 
enactment of BAPCPA, many courts found attorney fees 
owed by the debtor to the spouse’s attorney incurred during 
familial litigation fell into this category of domestic support 
debt,10 and, therefore, treated the fees as non-dischargeable.11 
This interpretation continued to follow the BAPCPA 
changes.12 This Note argues, as a general rule, that courts 
should not grant DSO status to attorney fees incurred in 
prepetition divorce settlements because the language of the 
statute requires it. Further, the overly-broad interpretation 
that the majority of courts have adopted could lead to a super-
creditor status for one type of attorney’s fee over others and 
create an undesirable and unanticipated boon for marital law 
 
6 Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002). 
7 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102, 119 Stat. 33, 27–29 (2005). 
8 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2009). 
9 In re Clarkson, 377 B.R. 283, 286 (Bankr. W.D. Wash., 2007) 
(Debts for attorney fees incurred prepetition are normally discharged in 
Chapter 7 proceeding). A debt is defined as “liability on a claim.”            
11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2009). A claim is defined as “right to payment, 
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured, 
or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2009). 
10 See, e.g., In re Hart, 130 B.R. 817, 849 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) 
(fee owed by debtor to former spouse’s attorney pursuant to agreement 
incorporated into divorce decree was nondischargeable); In re Maddigan, 
312 F.3d 589, 593 (2d Cir. 2002) (court held attorney fees for 
representation in custody litigation were debt for child support and did not 
need not be payable directly to a party listed in § 523(a)(5) in order to be 
nondischargeable), but see In re Perlin, 30 F.3d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(former spouse's attorney lacked standing to contest dischargeability 
because debtor owed fee to former spouse, not the attorney). 
11 In re Maddigan, 312 F.3d at 593. 
12 See, e.g., In re O'Brien, 339 B.R. 529, 531 n.2 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2006) (“Case law construing alimony, maintenance, and support has 
largely developed in respect of former § 523(a)(5) whose text is 
comparable to and largely mirrors section 101(14)(A)”). 





                                                
practitioners at the expense of the non-debtor spouse and the 
fresh start of “the honest but unfortunate” debtor. 
This Note will focus on consumer bankruptcy13 related to 
chapter 7 and chapter 13 filings. Section I provides an 
introduction to DSOs and the goals of enforcing them 
through bankruptcy. Section I also discusses the impact of 
DSO status on the automatic stay, discharge, priority status 
for property distribution of the bankruptcy estate, capability 
to reach exempt property, and application to attorney fees. 
Section II argues that, where attorney fees are not owed to a 
spouse, former spouse, or child, and do not fit within an 
impact exception, the fees are not DSOs, but instead are 
merely general non-secured claims. Finally, Section III 
argues that even when attorney fees are owed to, or have 
impact on, the spouse, former spouse, or child, courts should 




A. Underlying Policy Behind the BAPCPA  
          Changes to Domestic Support Obligations 
 
The BAPCPA revisions were roughly a decade in the 
making, involving several false starts.14 For legislation that 
was so hotly contested, and took so long to pass, there is 
precious little documentation from Congress regarding the 
decision making process.15 Four basic policies have been said 
 
13 The Code defines “Consumer debt” as “debt incurred by an 
individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.”          
11 U.S.C § 101(8). 
14 For a thorough discussion of the history of BAPCPA, see Susan 
Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (Summer 
2005). 
15 In re Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (noting 
that legislative history of act is limited, with no joint statement from a 
conference committee, nor reports by floor managers). 
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to underlie the BAPCPA changes involving family support 
obligations:16 
 
1.  Bankruptcy should interfere as little as 
possible with the establishment and collection 
of ongoing obligations for support, as allowed 
in state and family law courts. 
2.  The Bankruptcy Code should provide a broad 
and comprehensive definition of a Domestic 
Support Obligation, and all claims for 
Domestic Support Obligations should receive 
equal and favored treatment in the bankruptcy 
process. 
3. The bankruptcy process should ensure the 
continued payment of ongoing spousal and 
child support and family support arrearages 
with minimal need for participation by support 
creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. 
4.  The bankruptcy process should allow a debtor 
to liquidate non-dischargeable debt to the 
greatest extent possible within the bankruptcy 
case, and emerge from bankruptcy with the 
freshest start feasible.17 
 
Some of the predicted outcomes of the BAPCPA changes 
were reducing the necessity and cost of litigating family law 
issues in bankruptcy court,18 greater consistency between        
the Bankruptcy Code and federal child support           
enforcement programs, and “a clear recognition . . . that 
all . . . [family] . . . support debts are entitled to preferential 
treatment in bankruptcy.”19 Clearly, Congress wanted to 
prevent debtors from using bankruptcy as a means to avoid 
 
16 Philip L. Strauss & Karen Cordry, Domestic Support Issues from a 
Governmental Perspective, 41 FAM. L.Q. 321, 323–24 (2007). 
17 Id. 
18 Philip L. Strauss, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee     
on the Judiciary, February 10, 2005, http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/ 
testimony.cfm?id=1381&wit_id=3993 (last visited June 17, 2010). 
19 Id. 





                                                
financial responsibilities to spouses, former spouses and 
children. 
 
B. Domestic Support Obligations Defined 
 
Even before BAPCPA, the Bankruptcy Code contained an 
exception for debts relating to alimony, maintenance, or 
support under § 523(a)(5), which made such debts non-
dischargeable.20 In 1994, section 523(a)(15), discussed in 
detail infra, expanded the breadth of non-dischargeable 
marital debts.21 BAPCPA amended sections 523(a)(5) and 
(a)(15). Sections 523(a) and 523(a)(5) now state: 
 
20 The pre-BAPCPA version of § 525(a)(5) excepted from discharge 
any debt “to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony 
to, maintenance for or support of such spouse or child, in connection with 
a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, 
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent 
that . . . such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation 
of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 
402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been 
assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political 
subdivision of such State) . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(2000). This 
language has been held to be sufficiently similar to the language in the 11 
U.S.C 101(14A) definition of Domestic Support Obligation so as to make 
pre-BAPCPA case law interpreting § 523(a)(5) relevant. Levin v. Greco 
(In re Greco) 397 B.R. 102 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).  
21 The pre-BAPCPA version of § 523(a)(15) expanded 
nondischargeable debts to those “not of the kind described in paragraph 
(5) that [are] incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or 
separation or in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or 
other order of a court of record, a determination made in accordance with 
State or territorial law by a governmental unit unless– 
(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income 
or property of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the 
maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if 
the debtor is engaged in a business, for the payment of expenditures 
necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such 
business; or  
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“(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 
1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title [11 USCS § 727, 1141, 
1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b)] does not discharge an 
individual debtor from any debt – 
. . . .  
(5) for a domestic support obligation; . . . .”22 
 
 Attorney fees incurred during a divorce proceeding 
should not be treated as DSOs. To prove this summation, one 
must look at the elements which make up the definition of a 
DSO. DSOs are defined under § 101(14A) as: 
 
[A] debt that accrues before, on, or after the date 
of the order for relief in a case under this title, 
including interest that accrues on that debt as 
provided under applicable nonbankruptcy law 
notwithstanding any other provision of this title, 
that is – 
(A) owed to or recoverable by –  
(i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the 
debtor or such child's parent, legal guardian, or 
responsible relative; or  
(ii) a governmental unit;  
(B) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or 
support (including assistance provided by a 
governmental unit) of such spouse, former spouse, 
or child of the debtor or such child's parent, 
without regard to whether such debt is expressly 
so designated;  
 
(B) discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that 
outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or 
child of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2000).  
As discussed, infra, in Section III, the two balancing tests laid out in 
parts (A) and (B) were removed by the BAPCPA amendments. 
22 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2009). 





                                                
(C) established or subject to establishment 
before, on, or after the date of the order for relief 
in a case under this title, by reason of applicable 
provisions of – 
(i) a separation agreement, divorce decree, 
or property settlement agreement;  
(ii) an order of a court of record; or  
(iii) a determination made in accordance 
with applicable nonbankruptcy law by a 
governmental unit; and  
(D) not assigned to a nongovernmental entity, 
unless that obligation is assigned voluntarily by 
the spouse, former spouse, child of the debtor, or 
such child's parent, legal guardian, or responsible 
relative for the purpose of collecting the debt.23 
 
The definition contains four sections, A–D, which must 
be met for a debt to be deemed a domestic support 
obligation.24 A DSO is most commonly a court order to make 
alimony, spousal maintenance, or child support payments.25 
These kinds of obligations are often designated as support in 
the divorce decree, and clearly meet the requirements of 
§ 523(a)(5).26 Whether debts owed to a third-party meet these 
criteria is less clear and a source of some litigation.27   
 
23 11 U.S.C § 101(14A) (2009); see also Wis. Dep’t of Workforce 
Dev. v. Ratliff, 390 B.R. 607, 613 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008) (“The 
definition [in § 101(14A)] has four separate requirements; all four must be 
met for an obligation to be considered a domestic support obligation.”). 
24 See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev. v. Ratliff, 390 B.R. 607, 
613 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Forgette, 379 B.R. 623, 625 (Bankr. 
W.D. Va. 2007). 
25 James L. Musselman, Once Upon a Time in Bankruptcy Court: 
Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt Is No Fairy 
Tale, 41 FAM. L.Q. 249, 268 (2007). 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995) (fees to 
guardian ad litem and psychologist from divorce and child support 
proceedings were nondischargeable); In re Wolfe, 26 B.R. 781, 785 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (even without a hold harmless agreement, an auto 
loan incurred as a gift for former wife was in the nature of child support 
and was nondischargeable), compare with In re Stamper, 131 B.R. 433, 
436 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (debtor's obligation to holder of auto loan 
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The elements of section 101(14A) germane to this Note 
are (A)(i), debts “owed to or recoverable by — a spouse, 
former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child's parent, 
legal guardian, or responsible relative”, and (B), debts “in the 
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support . . . of such 
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child's 
parent, without regard to whether such debt is expressly so 
designated.”28 These are discussed in detail in Sections II and 
III respectively. 
  
C. Impact of Domestic Support Obligations 
           on Other Sections of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
1. Automatic Stay and Discharge 
 
The automatic stay is one of the great protections for the 
debtor filing for bankruptcy, as it prevents creditors from 
collecting on debts as well as engaging in other activities.29 
 
may be dischargeable, but hold harmless agreement is non-dischargeable, 
and to extent former spouse makes payments on car loan, she is entitled to 
recover those payments from debtor as a non-dischargeable obligation); In 
re Forgette, 379 B.R. 623, 625–26 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007) (divorce 
decree ordered debtor to pay car creditor; ex-spouse had no standing to 
bring claim since payments not ordered to her). 
28 Since attorney fees are usually established in the divorce agreement 
or by the court pursuant to a divorce proceeding, application of 
§§ 101(14A)(C) & (D) is straight forward and rarely if ever an issue in the 
types of cases analyzed in this Note. Likewise, § 101(14)(A)(ii) concerns 
governmental units, and is outside the scope of this Note. 
29 11 U.S.C.§ 362(a) states:  
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition 
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed 
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 
operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of – 
 (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or 
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or 
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced 
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title; 





                                                                                                    
The effect of the stay is automatic upon filing a bankruptcy 
proceeding.30 Generally, the stay remains in effect until 
property is no longer property of the estate, or the case is 
discharged or dismissed.31 Although, if a Chapter 7 or 13 
case has been dismissed and the debtor re-files within one 
year, the stay may only extend for thirty days,32 and willful 
violation of the automatic stay can result in actual damages 
and even punitive damages.33 Upon a successful discharge, 
section 524 permanently enjoins actions for debts stayed 
under § 362(a).34 
DSOs have special exemptions under sections 
362(b)(2)(A)–(C). The stay is not applicable to 
commencement or continuation of a civil action “for the 
establishment or modification of an order for domestic 
support obligations;35. . . collection of a domestic support 
obligation from property which is not property of the 
 
 (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the 
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case 
under this title; 
 (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of 
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; 
 (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of 
the estate; 
 (5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the 
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose 
before the commencement of the case under this title; 
 (6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor 
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
 (7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the 
debtor; and 
 (8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning a corporate debtor's tax liability for a 
taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning an 
individual debtor's tax liability for a taxable period ending before the 
order for relief under this title. 
30 Id. 
31 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(1)–(2) (2009). 
32 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2009). 
33 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2009). 
34 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2009). 
35 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2009). 
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estate;36. . . [and] the withholding of income that is property 
of the estate or debtor for purposes of payment of a domestic 
support obligation under court order or statute; . . . .”37  
 
2. Priority Status for Property Distribution 
 
In addition to the non-dischargeability of DSOs, the 
policy in favor of protecting the non-debtor spouses and 
children is evidenced by Congress giving prepetition DSO 
claims first priority under section 507.38 Prior to BAPCPA, 
debts owed for alimony, maintenance or support were only 
seventh on the section 507 priority list.  
Under section 507(a)(1), prepetition DSOs are given first 
priority for property distribution of the bankruptcy estate 
subject only to the payment of trustee expenses.39 Trustees 
are also required under sections 704(a)(10) and 1302(b)(6) to 
notify holders of DSOs in writing of their rights in collecting 
the obligations.40 Under Chapter 7, priority distributions are 
meted out to the creditors at each level of priority.41 So, first 
priority debtors are paid in full before second priority debtors, 
and so on, until all funds of the bankruptcy estate are 
exhausted.42 If there is not enough to pay all of the creditors 
at a particular level, then the funds are distributed pro rata 
 
36 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) (2009). 
37 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(C) (2009). Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(A) 
the following additional domestic relations actions are not exempt from 
the stay: 
1. establishment or modification of a domestic support obligation.  
2. establishment of paternity  
3. an action concerning child custody or visitation  
4. an action for the dissolution of marriage, except to the extent that 
such proceeding seeks to determine the division of property that is 
property of the estate  
5. an action regarding domestic violence. 
38 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2009). 
39 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2009). 
40 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(10) (2009); 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(6) (2009). 
41 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2009). 
42 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2009).  





amongst all the creditors at that particular level.43 For a 
Chapter 13 plan to be confirmed, it must provide for payment 
in full of all claims entitled to priority under section 507, 
unless the holder of the claim agrees to another 
arrangement.44 
 
3. Exempt Property 
 
Exempt property is property that cannot be reached by 
creditors, and is not considered part of the bankruptcy estate. 
A debtor declares exemptions under either state or federal 
law.45 Exempt property can include, among others, value for 
a homestead46 and retirement plans.47 The Congressional 
purpose behind exemptions is to give the “unfortunate 
bankruptcy debtor” a base from which to make his fresh 
start.48 Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(c), domestic support 
obligation debts may be recovered from exempt property: 
 
(c) Unless the case is dismissed, property 
exempted under this section is not liable during or 
after the case for any debt of the debtor that arose, 
or that is determined under section 502 of this title 
as if such debt had arisen, before the 
commencement of the case, except –  
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (2009). 
45 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2009). § 522(b)(3)(A) spells out a calculus for 
determining which state’s exemptions may be used based on length of 
domicile. This calculus can lead to interesting results, but discussion and 
analysis are beyond the scope of this Note. 
46 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2009) (roughly $20,000 in property used as 
a residence). Massachusetts allows for a $500,000 homestead exemption. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS 188, § 1 (2009). While Texas has an unlimited 
homestead exemption. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 41.001(a) (West 2009). 
47 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4)(A) (2009). 
48 Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption 
Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 31 (1983) (discussing bankruptcy exemption policies). 
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(1) a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (1) 
or (5) of section 523 (a) (in which case, 
notwithstanding any provision of applicable 
nonbankruptcy law to the contrary, such property 
shall be liable for a debt of a kind specified in 
section 523 (a)(5)).49 
 
There is a similar protection against exemption for 
judgment liens for DSOs.50   
 
D. An Introduction to DSO  
      Applicability to Attorney Fees 
 
A creditor is an “entity that has a claim against the debtor 
that arose at the time of or before the order for relief 
concerning the debtor; . . . .”51 Clearly, attorneys are creditors 
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code). However, a literal 
reading of the language of § 101(14A)(A)(i), debts “owed to 
or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the 
debtor or such child's parent, legal guardian, or responsible 
relative;” would appear to excluded attorney fees, or fees 
owed to any third party, from being included under 
§ 523(a)(5).52 But even before BAPCPA,53 a majority of 
courts found that third-party fees, including fees for attorneys 
who represented clients in marriage dissolution, fell under the 
                                                 
49 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) (2009). 
50 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2009). 
51 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (2009). 
52 Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002). 
53 Because the language of § 101(14A) is essentially identical to the 
pre-BAPCPA language of § 523(a)(5), courts view much of the pre-
BAPCPA case law involving support obligations as still valid. See, e.g., 
In re Boller, 393 B.R. 569, 574 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008) (“In 
determining what constitutes debt ‘in the nature of alimony, maintenance, 
or support’ under § 101(14A), the case law construing pre-BAPCPA 
§ 523(a)(5), which utilized the same language, is relevant.”) Accordingly, 
this Note cites to pre-BAPCPA cases that have not been overturned and 
which appear to the author to be consistent with the BAPCPA revisions. 





                                                
ambit of § 523(a)(5).54 At least two courts held attorney fees 
owed by the debtor to the non-debtor spouse were a unique 
exception, and excluded other third parties.55 
Many courts have held attorney fees related to divorce 
proceedings are in the nature of support.56 The function the 
award was intended to serve is the crucial issue in making the 
determination.57 The rationale behind some courts holding in 
this manner is if the debt were discharged, the non-debtor 
spouse would remain liable on the debt.58 Thus, finding the 
debts to be non-dischargeable support furthers the policy of 
protecting spouses and children.59 
 
54 See, e.g., In re Chang, 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(limitation to spouse or child should not be literally applied); In re Miller, 
55 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995) (guardian ad litem and psychologist 
fees incurred in connection with divorce and child support proceedings 
were non-dischargeable); In re Will, 116 B.R. 254, 255 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1990) (former spouse's attorneys were third-party beneficiaries with 
standing to contest dischargeability of fee); In re Haas, 129 B.R. 531, 535 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (attorney “fees incurred in connection with an 
award of maintenance or support are not dischargeable, and it is irrelevant 
that the debt is due directly to the attorney rather than to the ex-spouse.”); 
but compare In re Perlin, 30 F.3d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1994) (wife's attorney 
lacked standing to contest dischargeability of debtor's obligation to pay 
attorney fees because the debtor owed the debt in question to his former 
spouse, not to the attorney). 
55 See In re Wright, 184 B.R. 318, 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) 
(“Generally, an obligation for support must be owed directly to the spouse 
to be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5), (citation omitted) with an 
exception made for attorney's fees.”); In re Lewis, 39 B.R. 842, 846 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) (court limited non-dischargeable debts payable 
to third parties for attorney fees. Other third party debt was dischargeable 
as it was determined not to be in the nature of alimony and support). 
56 In re Lawrence, 237 B.R. 61, 85 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999) (citing e.g., 
Macy v. Macy, 114 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997)); In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 9 
(2d Cir. 1981); In re Kline, 65 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1995). 
57 In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983). 
58 Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002). 
59 Id. But where this policy does not apply, third-party creditors are 
not treated as beneficiary of a DSO. See In re Linn, 38 B.R. 762, 763 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) (where former spouse would incur no liability if 
debt owed directly to court-appointed attorney and psychiatrist in child 
custody battle was discharged, then policy of protecting child and spouse 
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The following sections will show the majority of courts 
have been far too liberal interpreting the relationship between 




Attorneys Are Not a Debtor’s “Spouse, Former 
Spouse, Child . . . or Such Child’s Parent,  
Legal Guardian, or Responsible Relative”60 
 
This section looks at 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i), the 
“owed to” clause in the definition of the domestic support 
obligation. Many courts have either minimized or ignored 
this clause in favor of its sibling, 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B), 
which deals with the nature of the debt.61 However, this is 
folly. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i) defines the class of entities 
to whom the definition of domestic support obligation 
applies. The three subsections below support this supposition. 
The first subsection looks at the plain meaning of the clause 
and finds attorney fees to be outside the ambit of the statutory 
language. In the second subsection, an impact exception to 
the plain meaning interpretation is explored and adopted. 
Finally, cases are reviewed from courts which have ignored 
the plain meaning of the statute, or supplanted it with the 
language from 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B), and the error of 
these arguments is revealed. 
 
 
60 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i) (2009). 
61 See infra Section II.C. 





                                                
A.  Plain Meaning of Statute Does  
Not Include Attorney Fees 
 
As mentioned above, the Congressional policy favoring a 
fresh start for the debtor generally leads courts to construe 
discharge exceptions strictly and narrowly.62 While under the 
Bankruptcy Code the debtor’s fresh start is subservient to the 
debtor’s responsibility to support family obligations63 and 
many of the BAPCPA revisions were designed to protect 
receivers of support and alimony,64 this does not mean that 
basic rules of statutory construction should be ignored. 
Where a statute’s language is plain, then the court’s 
obligation is to enforce the statute according to its terms, 
unless the result would be absurd.65 Section 101(14A)(A)(i) 
specifically limits the scope of domestic support obligations 
to an identifiable class.66 While the clause “debts owed to or 
recoverable by” in § 101(14A)(A) is broader than the pre-
 
62 Shayna M. Steinfeld, The Impact of Changes Under the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 on 
Family Obligations, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 251, 268 
(2007) (citing to e.g., In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1998); 
Bellco Fed. Credit Union v. Kaspar (In re Kaspar), 125 F.3d 1358 (10th 
Cir. 1997); Palmacci v. Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781 (1st Cir. 1997); In re 
Ward, 857 F.2d 1082 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Belfry, 862 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 
1988); In re Van Horne, 823 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1987); Schweig v. 
Hunter (In re Hunter), 780 F.2d 1577 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Black, 787 
F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1986)). 
63 Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002). 
64 See generally, The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 and its Impact on the Practice of Family Law, 
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/consumer/vol5num2/Co
nsumerComm3.pdf (last visited June 17, 2010) adapted from Hon. Sandy 
Karlan, New Act Enhances Protection of Support Recipients, FLA. FAM. 
LAW REP. 2006, Issue 3 (March 2006). 
65 Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004). 
66 “A spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child's 
parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative . . . .” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(14A)(A)(i) (2009). 
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BAPCPA incarnation,67 the new definition does not expand 
the class of entities to include attorneys.68 The plain language 
of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) limits the discharge exception to a 
“spouse, former spouse, child . . . or such child’s parent, legal 
guardian, or responsible relative,” and does not include debts 
owed to third parties.69 
 
B. “Impact Exception” to Plain Meaning 
 
Judge Robert Mark, in the pre-BAPCPA case In re 
Gentilini,70 spelled out an exception to the plain meaning of 
§ 523(a)(5) in cases where discharge of the third party debt 
would impact the former spouse.71 This Note will refer to it 
as the Impact Exception.  
While Gentilini was decided before BAPCPA, it deals 
with the language of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(A)(i) discussed 
above, which in substance mirrors that of former § 523(a)(5). 
Gentilini involved a Chapter 7 bankruptcy in which the 
attorneys, who represented the former spouse in previous 
divorce proceedings, sought judgment from the bankruptcy 
court under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) to except from discharge 
fees awarded by the state court.72   
 
67 See supra note 20 for discussion of pre-BAPCPA language for 
§ 523(a)(5), which was replaced by domestic support obligation definition 
in § 101(14A) (2009).  
68 In re Brooks, 371 B.R. 761, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007); but 
compare In re Poole, 383 B.R. 308, 313 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2007) (“Since the 
language of the new definition includes debts ‘owed to or recoverable by’ 
a spouse, debts to be paid directly to third parties such as the attorney's 
fees and credit card payments would not necessarily be excluded if they 
are enforceable and recoverable by the spouse via further proceedings in 
the Family Court.”) (internal citations omitted). 
69 Id. at 764.  
70 In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. 251 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007). 
71 Id. at 254–55. 
72 Id. at 251–52. 





                                                
In his analysis, Judge Mark cited the Sixth Circuit case In 
re Spong,73 and the Eight Circuit case In re Kline74 for the 
proposition that an exception exists to the plain meaning 
interpretation of the statute where “the debt [is] in the nature 
of support and the former spouse would be financially 
impacted by discharg[e of] the debt.”75 In Spong, the court 
found that whether a debt was owed to a former spouse 
should be a matter of substance rather than form,76 and that 
an agreement by the debtor to pay the former spouse’s 
attorney for fees incurred during the divorce was in substance 
a debt arising from a “paradigmatic third party beneficiary 
contract . . . .”77 Since such contracts are enforceable by both 
the third-party beneficiary and the promissee, denying the 
debt as owed to the spouse would be an illogical victory of 
form over substance.78 In Kline, the court found a debt to the 
attorney of the former spouse non-dischargeable, where if the 
debt had been discharged the former spouse would have 
remained liable in quantum meruit for the debt.79  
In Gentilini, Judge Mark found that the attorney fees 
owed by the debtor were in the nature of support.80 However, 
the Impact Exception did not apply, because at the time of the 
bankruptcy petition, the statute of limitations had run on the 
retainer agreement between the attorneys and the former 
spouse, and the law firm could no longer enforce it.81 As the 
former spouse would not be benefited by the paying of the 
fees, nor harmed by non-payment, the plain meaning of the 
statute applied.82 The debt was not owed to the spouse, and 
thus the fees were dischargeable.83   
 
73 In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981). 
74 In re Kline, 65 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1995). 
75 In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. at 254–55. 
76 In re Spong, 661 F.2d at 11. 
77 Id. at 10. 
78 Id. at 10–11. 
79 In re Kline, 63 F.3d at 751. 
80 In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. 251, 253 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007). 
81 Id. at 258. 
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The Impact Exception makes a great deal of sense. In a 
hypothetical case, where a debt to an attorney was created 
because the spouse had to bring suit to recover arrearages on 
a DSO, such as an alimony or child custody dispute, and the 
spouse remained liable to her attorney for the fee, then it 
makes sense that the attorney fee would be treated as a DSO 
itself.84 Applying the logic of the court in Spong, that the 
debtor owes the fee directly to the attorney should not bar 
recovery. To cause the non-debtor spouse to bear the cost of 
enforcement would create an unfair burden. Another example 
would be a debtor who owes child support, but has not paid 
in several months, so the custodial parent brings suit to 
collect the funds, perhaps asking the state under state law to 
garnish wages of the non-custodial former spouse. If the 
custodial parent wins, and the state court awards attorney 
fees, it would seem antithetic to the purpose of enforcing the 
obligation to allow the debtor to discharge the attorney fee 
debt and leave the non-debtor spouse to bear the cost of 
enforcement.85   
Thus, the Impact Exception should supersede the plain 
meaning of the statute and allow attorney fees to be held non-
dischargeable where the fee debt is in the nature of support 
and the spouse, former spouse, child or child’s parent, legal 
guardian or responsible relative remains liable on the fees. 
But where there is no impact on a former spouse or child, the 




84 See generally In re O’Brien, 367 B.R. 240 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) 
(holding that attorney fees owed by debtor for post-divorce custody 
proceeding was in the nature of support).  
85 Attorney fees, interest, and other costs meant to make the spouse or 
child whole after debtor’s failure to uphold the support obligation should 
not be dischargeable. But purely punitive awards against the debtor, 
should be dischargeable, as they do not serve to support the familial 
obligation and thus only hinder the debtor in making a fresh start. See 
generally In re Smith, 398 B.R. 715 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008) (the court held 
that a $50 a day penalty for late alimony payments was not in the nature 
of support, and thus claim of former-spouses which consisted only of 
penalty fees was dischargeable). The issue of support is discussed in 
detail, infra, in Section III. 





                                                
C. Overly Broad Interpretation Erroneously  
      Defeats Plain Meaning of the Statute 
 
Many courts have created expansive interpretations of the 
DSO.86 These interpretations focus primarily, and in some 
cases exclusively, on the nature of the debt and minimize or 
ignore the “owed to” clause.87 For these courts, finding that 
the debt is in the nature of support is in effect the sin qua non 
of the analysis, but all four elements of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) 
must be met, and the language of the statute does not imply 
one clause is to be given weight to the exclusion of another. 
This section looks at rulings of courts which have such broad 
interpretations, and discloses the shortcomings of their 
analysis.  
The Eighth Circuit has one of the most overly-broad 
applications. Citing to its holding in Kline, mentioned supra, 
the Eighth Circuit in In re Kemp pronounced “[i]t is the 
nature of the debt, not the identity of the payee, that 
determines the debt’s dischargeability . . . .”88 This statement 
omits the analysis in Kline which focused on the liability of 
the spouse, and the per curiam opinion was rendered with 
little analysis. Since Kline, the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy 
Courts have focused on the “in the nature of support” clause 
as a kind of shorthand to all but eviscerate the “owed to” 
clause.89 For example, In re Cavaluzzi is a 2007 Chapter 7 
 
86 See, e.g., In re Staggs, 203 B.R. 712, 722 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) 
(court held guardian ad litem fees to be nondischargeable as in nature of 
support); In re Cavaluzzi, 364 B.R. 363, 365–66 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2007) 
(court held attorney fees incurred in child-support modification were in 
nature of support, and thus nondischargeable); In re Akamine, 217 B.R. 
104, 107–08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1488 
(10th Cir. 1995); In re Chang, 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998); In re 
Lawrence, 237 B.R. 61 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999) (citing e.g., In re Macy, 114 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)).   
87 In re Akamine, 217 B.R. at 107 (“It is well-settled that as far as 
long as a debt is deemed to be 'support' it need not be payable directly to a 
child or spouse in order to be nondischargeable.”). 
88 In re Kemp, 232 F.3d 652, 653 (8th Cir. 2000). 
89 See, e.g., In re Staggs, 203 B.R. at 722 (court held guardian ad 
litem fees to be nondischargeable as in nature of support); In re Cavaluzzi, 
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case where the attorney for the debtor’s former spouse 
brought an adversary complaint to have her fees declared 
nondischargeable.90 The fees stemmed from a pre-petition 
child support modification hearing.91 The court in Cavaluzzi 
correctly identified the attorney fees for child support actions 
can be considered in the nature of support, in part citing to 
the holding in the First Circuit case In re Macy.92 The court 
then cites to Kline for the proposition that fees owed directly 
to an attorney are non-dischargeable if in the nature of the 
support.93 However, the court’s inquiry stops there. The court 
finds the fees were incurred in a child support order, they 
were in the nature of support, and they were reasonable.94 
Yet, the court never discusses the liability of the former 
spouse. The court in Kline reasoned it had no doubt the non-
debtor spouse would be held liable in quantum meruit.95 
Thus, the Kline court’s analysis was similar to the two-prong 
analysis required of the Impact Exception. The Bankruptcy 
Court in Cavaluzzi omits the liability step without comment 
(and with the un-cited, though applicable blessing of the 
Eighth Circuit in Kemp). However, this analysis fails to apply 
the law, either the plain language of the statute or the Impact 
Exception, correctly. 
 
364 B.R. at 365 (court held attorney fees incurred in child-support 
modification were in nature of support, and thus nondischargeable).  
90 In re Cavaluzzi, 364 B.R. at 364. 
91 Id. 
92 In re Cavaluzzi, 364 B.R. 363, 365 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2007) (citing 
In re Macy, 114 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 In re Kline, 63 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1995). 





                                                
The Eighth Circuit is not alone in this overly-broad 
interpretation. The Tenth Circuit, in In re Miller, held the fees 
owed by the debtor directly to a guardian ad litem and court 
appointed psychiatrist were nondischargeable.96 The court 
found the proper emphasis was on the nature of the debt, and 
not the identity of the payee. 97 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit 
cited to the “precedent” of its holding in the case In re 
Jones.98 However, as Judge Mark adroitly points out in 
Gentilini, “[t]he Miller court felt bound by Jones, even 
though it specifically noted that Jones did not address the 
issue of to whom the debt was payable.”99 Similarly, the 
Ninth Circuit in In re Chang held “the identity of the payee is 
less important than the nature of the debt.”100 But the court 
did not explain under what theory of statutory interpretation 
one necessary element of a statute becomes less important 
than another.101   
The examples above make clear that many jurisdictions 
are basing there decisions on an incomplete analysis, and may 
be assessing fees to the debtor in ways that do not meet the 
stated goal of benefiting the spouse, former spouse, or child 
by enforcing the debtor’s familial obligations. Not only is it 
an unwarranted expansion of the plain meaning of the statute, 
but as one court aptly stated, “[e]xcluding these debts from 
discharge will not further the bankruptcy goal of a fresh start 
unburdened by old debts, [n]or will it protect spouses, former 
spouses and children from being injured by a debtor's 
discharge.”102 In the case of attorney fees, the benefit to the 
attorney would come completely at the expense of the 
debtor’s fresh start.  
 
 
96 In re Miller, 55 F.3d 1487, 1488 (10th Cir. 1995). 
97 Id. at 1490. 
98 Id. at 1489 (citing In re Jones, 9 F.3d 878 (10th Cir.1993)). 
99 In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. 251, 256 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing 
In re Miller, 55 F.3d at 1489). 
100 In re Chang, 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998). 
101 In re Gentilini, 365 B.R. at 256. 
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SECTION III 
 
Attorney Fees Generally Are Not Support Obligations 
 
Having established attorney fees may be DSOs if the 
spouse or child remains liable and if the fees are in the nature 
of support, the next logical step is to discuss when attorney 
fees should be considered in the nature of support. Here the 
case law is fractured. Section 101(14A)(B) provides that the 
DSOs must be “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or 
support . . . of such spouse, former spouse, or child of the 
debtor or such child's parent, without regard to whether such 
debt is expressly so designated.”103 But just what constitutes 
support is the subject of much litigation, and there is a 
general lack of agreement among the courts in the factors that 
should be used to resolve these cases.104 
The term support is not defined in the Code, but most 
courts do agree on three principles of review. First, generally 
exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy should be viewed 
narrowly, the term “support” should be interpreted broadly as 
applied to domestic support obligations.105 Second, what 
constitutes support is a matter of federal bankruptcy law, not 
controlled by the state court’s interpretation.106 And third, 
 
103 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A)(B) (2009).  
104 See James L. Musselman, Once Upon a Time in Bankruptcy 
Court: Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt Is No 
Fairy Tale, 41 FAM. L. Q. 249, 269–70 (2007). 
105 See, e.g., In re Crosswhite, 148 F.3d 879, 881 (7th Cir.1998) 
(holding that the usual strict construction of exceptions to discharge is not 
applicable to support obligations, in light of a “longstanding . . . policy of 
protecting a debtor's spouse and children when the debtor's support is 
required.”); In re Maddigan, 312 F.3d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 2002) (“there is 
ample justification for construing certain statutory terms broadly, albeit 
with the confines of the narrow-construction rule. We have clearly stated 
that among the concepts to be given broad interpretation is the meaning of 
'in the nature of support.'”) (citation omitted). 
106 In re Chase, 392 B.R. 72, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“an 
independent inquiry to determine whether a debt characterized as 
alimony, maintenance, or support [is] actually in the nature of alimony, 





                                                                                                    
based on various factors, the intent of the parties or the 
divorce court is the driving force in the bankruptcy court’s 
examination.107   
It is these varying factors, and the weight to be given to 
each, where the courts differ.108 This results in courts looking 
at similar fact patterns to reach very different conclusions.109 
Courts have held that the crucial issue in making the 
determination of whether third-party debts, including attorney 
fees, are support is the function the award was intended to 
serve.110 The following subsections argue that because the 
term support is amorphous and undefined in the Code, the 
plain meaning of the statute cannot be applied, and so the 
underlying policies drive the analysis. Then the policies for 
treating attorney fees as support obligations are weighed 
against reasons not to hold them as such. This analysis leads 
to the conclusion that attorney fees should generally not be 
treated as DSO obligations.  
 
 
maintenance, or support . . . is made under federal, not state, law, and is 
not governed by state law treatment of the obligation nor by the label the 
parties have used to describe the obligation.”); In re Hazelton, 304 B.R. 
145, 152 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2003) (“Federal standards, not state law, are 
used when determining whether a debt is in the nature of either alimony, 
maintenance or support.”). 
107 See, e.g., In re Sanabria, 275 B.R. 204, 207 (Bankr. D. N.J. 
2002)(“whether an obligation falls within the category of support or 
alimony, as opposed to a property settlement depends upon the intent of 
the parties at the time of the settlement agreement.”); In re Pulley, 355 
B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006) (In order to except debt from 
discharge, “[t]he creditor must show that the parties intended to create a 
support obligation and that the obligation actually provides necessary 
support.”); In re Hammermeister, 270 B.R. 863, 871 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
2001) (“the obligation constitutes support only if the state court or parties 
intended to create a support obligation"); In re Turner, 266 B.R. 491, 497 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001) (“whether the obligation is in the 'nature of 
support' requires examination of parties' or court's intent and the 
substance of obligation.”). 
108 See, infra, notes 108 and 109. 
109 Musselman, supra note 104, at 269. 
110 In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983). 
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A. The Factors 
 
Factors that some circuits have used to guide their 
decisions as to whether attorney fees constitute a 
nondischargeable debt are: (1) the language of the divorce 
decree; (2) the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of 
the divorce decree; and (3) the function served by the award 
of attorneys' fees at the time of the divorce decree.111 But 
other circuits look at whether the support maintained daily 
necessities of the spouse or child,112 or whether a property 
award appears to “assuage need.”113 These tests all seem to 
boil down to a “totality of the circumstances” analysis. 
Though, in this context, the totality of the circumstances 
might be as amorphous as the phrase “in the nature of 
support” itself. 
Courts have held that attorney fees awarded for collection 
of alimony, maintenance and support obligations are so 
intertwined as to follow the underlying obligation.114 For 
example, the Tenth Circuit has a broad interpretation that 
looks at the nature of the underlying action, not the intent of 
the parties or the court.115 The Tenth Circuit Court held, in 
part, that absent unusual circumstances “court-ordered 
attorney fees arising from post-divorce custody action are 
deemed in the nature of support.”116 But this interpretation is 
too broad, and courts that have rejected this logic in other 
§ 523(a) exemption situations.117  
 
111 In re Hale, 289 B.R. 788, 796 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.2003). 
112 In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 763 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
113 In re Smith, 398 B.R. 715, 721 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008). 
114 See, e.g., In re Macy, 192 B.R. 802, 806 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). 
115 See In re Jones, 9 F.3d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1993). 
116 Id. at 881. 
117 In re Ziegler, 109 B.R. 172, 175–77 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1989) 
(court ruling on attorney fees in § 523(a)(6) case stated that attorney fees 
should not be held non-dischargeable simply because of the underlying 
debt was non-dischargeable). 





                                                
The appropriate analysis is expressed by Judge Isicoff in 
In re Lopez.118 In that case, the former spouse argued that 
because the claim for attorney fees arose from a custody, 
parentage, or visitation matter, they were in the nature of 
support.119 But the court found that interpretation of the 
support to be too broad, stating “not every obligation created 
in connection with, or arising out of, a domestic matter, ipso 
facto, qualifies as a domestic support obligation.”120 The state 
court’s order stated the fees were awarded based on the bad 
faith of the debtor during the custody proceeding, and “not 
based upon the respective wages or ability of parties to 
pay.”121 Thus, the fees were not in the nature of support.122 In 
other words, just because the action arises from a divorce 
decree, does not mean the attorney fees assessed are domestic 
support obligations.  
But that begs the question; under what conditions should 
attorney fees be considered in the nature of support? To 
answer, one must look at the policy arguments in favor of, 
and in opposition to, attorney fees as domestic support 
obligations. 
 
B. Policy Argument for Finding DSO is Weighed 
          Against Potential Harm to Debtor and Family 
 
1. A Look at the Policy Arguments  
            for Making Attorney Fees DSOs 
 
There are two basic policy arguments favoring the 
treatment of attorney fees arising from divorce, separation, 
and the like and owed by the debtor to either the former 
spouse’s attorney or the former spouse as DSOs:                  
 
118 In re Lopez, 405 B.R. 382 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009). 
119 Id. at 384. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 385. 
122 Id.  
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(1) protecting the non-debtor spouse and children—which has 
been reviewed in length in the sections above,123 and (2) to 
prevent depleting the pool of attorneys willing to take on such 
cases. As will be shown in the following section, these 
arguments are unpersuasive especially in light of the changes 
to BAPCPA which make 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) a much 
more salient provision to apply to attorney fees in Chapter 7 
cases. In the first case, treating attorney fees as DSOs may 
actually hurt rather than help the non-debtor spouse or child. 
In the second instance, the policy does not hold up to close 
scrutiny. The rationale of the courts that have held attorney 
fees related to divorce proceedings to be in the nature of 
support, is that if the debt were discharged, the non-debtor 
spouse would remain liable on the debt.124 Thus, finding the 
debts to be non-dischargeable support furthers the policy of 
protecting spouses and children.125   
Another argument put forth is that to find attorney fees as 
non-support obligations would lead to a depletion of the pool 
of attorneys willing to take on these cases.126 The gist of the 
second argument is that courts fear if attorney fees are not 
treated as support obligations, spouses and children may not 
find adequate counsel. “[A] spouse's need for adequate legal 
representation in a lawsuit affecting the marital status is not 
materially different from those other needs—from 
 
123 See Section I.D., supra.  
124 Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002); see also 
generally In re Lawrence, 237 B.R. 61 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1999) citing e.g., 
Macy v. Macy, 114 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d 
Cir. 1981); In re Kline, 65 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1995). 
125 Bankruptcy Law Manual § 8A:10 (5th ed. 2002); But where this 
policy does not apply, third-party creditors are not treated as beneficiary 
of a DSO. See In re Linn, 38 B.R. 762 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) (where 
former spouse would incur no liability if debt owed directly to court-
appointed attorney and psychiatrist in child custody battle was discharged, 
then policy of protecting child and spouse not implicated as only benefit 
to non-dischargeability would be to third-party creditor). 
126 Sheryl L. Scheible, Defining “Support” Under Bankruptcy Law: 
Revitalization of the “Necessaries” Doctrine, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1, at 44 
(1988) (citing to In re Dupont, 19 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); 
Richards v. Loncar, 14 Bankr. 276, 278 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981)).  





                                                
subsistence to the education of children—which fall within 
the more common meaning of alimony or support . . . .”127  
This second argument is persuasive on the surface, but it 
fails for three reasons: (1) The adequacy of counsel argument 
can be shared by all other attorneys; (2) there is nothing in the 
historical record to indicate that Congress intended to give a 
higher priority over all other advocates to marital law 
attorneys who represent divorce clients whose spouses end up 
owing them attorney fees; and (3) because non-support 
attorney fees can be considered non-dischargeable marital 
debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), family law practitioners in 
this situation can still avoid discharge in the vast majority of 
bankruptcies without necessitating a declaration of the debt as 
a DSO. 
 
a. Adequacy of Counsel 
 
First, as a general rule in bankruptcy, attorney fees are 
dischargeable.128 That a client who owes a practitioner 
money might declare bankruptcy and be able to discharge his 
fee debt is a risk most practitioners take. The debtor’s family 
law practitioner’s fees are dischargeable,129 as are the fees of 
 
127 In re Soforenko, 203 B.R. 853, 862 (Bankr. .D. Mass. 1997) 
(quoting Goldman v. Roderiques, 349 N.E.2d 335, 337 (Mass. 1976)). 
128 In re DeRoche, 434 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Consistent 
with this philosophy, we have held that, absent bad faith or harassment, 
attorney’s fees are not recoverable in bankruptcy for litigating issues 
'peculiar to federal bankruptcy law.'  The Bankruptcy Code does contain 
some fee provisions. However, it does not contain any provisions that 
create a general right for the prevailing party to be awarded attorney’s 
fees in federal bankruptcy litigation. Thus, we have held that ‘[t]here is no 
general right to recover attorney's fees under the Bankruptcy Code’”) 
(citations omitted); Rittenhouse v. Eisen, 404 F.3d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 
2005) (debt for pre-petition legal fees not excluded from discharge under 
§ 523(a)). 
129 In re O’Brien, 367 B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) 
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attorneys whose clients have earned malpractice awards.130 
Even a judgment lien that an attorney may have acquired 
against a former client can be discharged if it is levied against 
exempt property.131 
The same adequacy of counsel argument made for family 
law practitioners who represent a client who ends up the 
holder of a Domestic Support Obligation can be made by 
practitioners in any number of areas where the judgments and 
accompanying attorney fees are dischargeable.132 Yet 
attorney fees owed in these other cases are deemed 
dischargeable. 
 
b. No Congressional Intent 
 
Secondly, nowhere in the definition of DSO in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(14a), nor in its application in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), 
nor in the congressional history of 1978, or the amendments 
in 1986, 1994, or 2005, does it appear that attorney fees were 
contemplated as domestic support obligations.133 This is 
court-invented interpretation, and as discussed in the sections 
below, the results of holding attorney fees as DSOs could 
have far reaching and undesirable results. 
 
 
130 Hughes v. Sanders, 469 F.3d 475, 479 (6th Cir. 2006) (default 
malpractice award was dischargeable). 
131 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2009). 
132 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 64 (1998) (holding that 
medical negligence is not “willful and malicious injury” under § 523(a)(6) 
exemption, the phrase only applies to intentional torts, and therefore debt 
remains dischargeable). 
133 In re Brooks, 371 B.R. 761, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (“[I]n 
going out of its way to define, in newly enacted section 101(14A), the list 
of entities . . . that may assert claims related to a ‘domestic support 
obligation,’ Congress did not add attorneys to the list, though it certainly 
could have.”). 





                                                
c. Non-Support Obligations Arising from  
               Divorce Proceedings are Not Dischargeable 
 
Section 523(a)(15) of the Code applies to all divorce 
related debts owed to the spouse, former spouse, or child of 
the debtor that are not domestic support obligations.134 The 
operative clause of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) related to 
applicability changed under BAPCPA to essentially mirror 
that of the pre-BAPCPA § 523(a)(5).135 Like a DSO under 
§ 523(a)(5), a non-domestic support obligation, owed to a 
spouse, former spouse, or child which arose under a divorce 
decree or settlement agreement, under § 523(a)(15) does not 
require a complaint to be filed.136 Whereas other debts which 
may be excepted from discharge must be filed within sixty 
days of the first set meeting of creditors.137 Thus, attorney 
fees can be argued as non-dischargeable non-support 
obligations under § 523(a)(15). This would minimize the 
inadequate support argument because the debts would still 
remain non-dischargeable, so the marital law attorneys could 
still get paid. 
 
134 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2009). 
135 11 U.S.C.§ 523 (a)(15) (2009) reads “to a spouse, former spouse, 
or child of the debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is 
incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in 
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a 
court of record . . . .”; compare with “to a spouse, former spouse, or child 
of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse 
or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or 
other order of a court of record . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994). 
136 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2009). FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c) provides 
that a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c) 
shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting 
of creditors. Section 523(c) encompasses § 523(a)(2), § 523(a)(4), and 
§ 523(a)(6). Previous to the 2005 BAPCPA changes, § 523(c) had also 
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As is discussed below, while the 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) 
exception does not have the same breadth as 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(5), particularly in Chapter 13 cases, neither does it 
carry with it all of the power of a DSO which can potentially 
harm the debtor and the family member to which obligations 
are owed.138  
 
2. A Policy Argument Against  
              Treating Attorney Fees as DSOs 
 
Even before BAPCPA, support obligations under the old 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) were exempt from discharge, but the 
BAPCPA changes to the provisions for exemptions139 and 
priorities140 give domestic support obligations unprecedented 
reach into the bankruptcy estate and beyond for collection. 
Congress did not contemplate treating attorney fees as DSOs, 
moreover, it runs counter to the goal of protecting the spouse 
and child, and does so at the expense of other creditors and 
the “honest but unfortunate” debtor’s “fresh start.” The 
following subsections review the potential negative impact on 
the debtor and his spouse, former spouse, and child if DSO 
status is extended to attorney fees. 
 
a. Reaching through to Exempt Property 
 
Exempt property is one of the great protections of 
bankruptcy; it ensures the debtor exits after a discharge with 
enough assets to begin his “fresh start.” A judgment lien for a 
malpractice case, and the accompanying contingency fees, 
 
138 Section III.C., infra, looks at the breadth of § 523(a)(15) in the 
context of chapter 13 bankruptcy; Section III.B. looks at the dangers of 
treating attorney fees as DSOs. 
139 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2009), discussed, supra, in Section I.C.3. 
140 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2009), discussed, supra, in Section I.C.2. 





                                                
may be discharged.141 However, if the family law 
practitioner’s fees are owed, not by his client, but by a 
bankrupt opponent, they are treated as a DSO, and the 
practitioner can then gain access to the debtor’s exempt 
property.142 
While courts have held that a trustee cannot seek to 
collect exempt property to satisfy a DSO,143 former spouses 
have successfully brought such actions.144 Ostensibly, if 
attorney fees are DSOs, then attorneys will be able to pilfer 
the coffers of exempt property to recover their fees. No cases 
directly on this point have been recorded since 2005. The 
expansive language of 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1), 
“notwithstanding any provision of applicable non-bankruptcy 
law to the contrary”, implies this could even allow the 
attorney to avoid state law exemptions for homestead and 
other property.145 One author has opined that DSO creditors 
must exhaust all exempt assets before reaching down into 
 
141 See Hughes v. Sanders, 469 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2006) (default 
malpractice award was dischargeable). 
142 Claude R. Bowles, Expecting the Unexpected: Unusual Domestic 
Relations Law Issues That May Arise Under the BAPCPA, 41 FAM. L.Q. 
343, 352–53 (2007). 
143 In re Ruppel, 368 B.R. 42, 42 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007) (Chapter 7 
debtor's exempt property was not property of his bankruptcy estate subject 
to administration by trustee, and thus trustee had no authority to liquidate 
exempt non-estate property for benefit of DSO claimant.); In re Quezada, 
368 B.R. 44, 45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (Code provision added by 
BAPCPA, to render exempt property liable for certain tax debts and 
DSOs, did not limit debtor's right to claim all exemptions otherwise 
available to him, and did not provide basis for disallowance of homestead 
exemption. While property might be subject to execution by DSO 
creditor, this did not mean that trustee could administer this exempt 
homestead property for benefit of DSO creditors); In re Vandeventer, Jr., 
2007 368 B.R. 50, 54 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007)(The trustee cannot reach the 
exempt property, because it is not part of the estate), but see In re Galtieri, 
172 Fed. Appx. 397 (3d Cir. 2006). 
144 In re Crum, 414 B.R. 103, 110–11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.) (slip 
opinion) (holding debtor's IRA account to be generally exempt, but not 
exempt from domestic support obligation); In re MacGibbon, 383 B.R. 
749 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2008) (neither former wife nor the State violated 
the automatic stay in enforcing, assessing, and collecting support from 
exempt assets). 
145 Bowles, supra note 142, at 352–53. 
 
 
134                  Trends and Issues in Bankruptcy            Vol. 4 
 
 
                                                
nonexempt property.146 While the rationale behind avoiding 
exemptions to obtain funds for support debts like alimony 
and child support fits with the policy discussed previously,147 
and many may applaud allowing a former spouse or child to 
pursue exempt property of a deadbeat father who refuses to 
pay child support or alimony, there are many debts related to 
the dissolution of a marriage that bear no such social stigma, 
and there is no compelling policy explanation for extending 
this power to attorney fees. 
There may be an even more far-lasting and detrimental 
result for the family members to which a DSO is owed. 
Allowing the attorney to raid the equity in a home or the 
retirement account of a debtor will mean that the debtor is 
hindered that much more in her attempt at a fresh start. If, as 
a result of this hindrance, the debtor is unable to meet 
domestic support obligations to the spouse or child, payment 
of the attorney fees will have acted to thwart the very changes 
BAPCPA seeks to ensure. 
 
b. Priorities: Pro Rata Distribution 
     might hurt the non-debtor client 
 
Treating attorney fees as DSOs means that the attorney 
fees will share priority status with other DSOs which may 
have arrearages, such as child support and alimony. If 
attorney fees are given domestic support obligation status by 
the bankruptcy court, then in Chapter 7 cases where the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate lacks sufficient funds to pay both 
the DSO owed directly to the family member and the DSO 
owed to the attorney, the pro rata distribution would have the 
effect of diminishing the amount recoverable by the spouse 
and child.148 Certainly, diminishing the support payments 
 
146 Edward W. Vopat, Domestic Support Obligations Under the 
Revised Bankruptcy Code, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3, 20 (June 2008). 
147 See Sections I.D. and III.B.1., supra. 
148 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2009) (“[P]roperty of the estate shall be 
distributed . . . first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in 





                                                                                                    
was not an objective of Congress, nor a desirable result as a 
matter of policy.  
It is true this result will not occur often because in most 
Chapter 7 bankruptcies there is nothing left to distribute once 
the secured creditors have been satisfied.149 However, it can 
occur and will occur in at least some circumstances, thus it is 
reason enough to seek another avenue for collection of these 
fees. 
Therefore, as a general rule, conferring DSO status to 
attorney fees does not enhance the policy of protecting the 
spouse, former spouse, or child. 
 
c. Solution: Apply Impact Exception and  
  Treat Attorney Fees as § 523(a)(15) debts 
 
Attorney fees generally need not be treated as DSOs to 
protect the support due to a debtor’s family. In cases where 
the debtor’s spouse, former spouse, child or the party 
responsible for the child remains liable for attorney fees, the 
impact exception should be applied to the debt, but rather 
than holding the debt in the nature of support, the attorney 
fees should be treated as nondischargeable divorce-related 
debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). 
 
the order specified in, section 507 of this title . . . .”). This is not true of 
Chapter 13 cases, though. A Chapter 13 plan, under § 1322(a)(2), must 
“provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims 
entitled to priority under section 507 of this title[11 USCS § 507], unless 
the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such 
claim; . . . .” So, under Chapter 13, the debt must be paid, but the order 
of priority doesn’t appear to be specifically enforced as it is in Chapter 7.   
149 See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 and its Impact on the Practice of Family Law 5–6, 
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/consumer/vol5num2/Co
nsumerComm3.pdf adapted from Hon. Sandy Karlan, New Act Enhances 
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i. Some Courts have used  
          § 523(a)(15) for attorney fees 
 
Section 523(a)(15) was added to the Bankruptcy Code in 
1994, and expanded the marital debts that could be made 
dischargeable beyond support obligations.150 But it contained 
a balancing clause that was difficult for courts to apply.151  
BAPCPA revised the language of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15), 
which now reads: 
 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 
1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not 
discharge an individual debtor from any debt–  
. . . . 
(15) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the 
debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph 
(5) that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a 
divorce or separation or in connection with a 
separation agreement, divorce decree or other 
order of a court of record, or a determination made 
in accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental unit; . . . .152 
 
150 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1994). H.R. REP. 103-835, P.L. 103-394, 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. 
151 In re Klem 362 B.R. 585, 592 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007) (“sorting 
out the various burdens ‘of going forward’ under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) 
as it appeared prior to October 17, 2005 is to solve a Gordian's Knot”). 
The following is a very cursory explanation of the balancing test:  Once 
the court determined that the debt would fall within the parameters of 
§ 523(a)(15), the court would then have to determine “whether the debtor 
has the ability to pay the obligation in question out of income not 
reasonably necessary for the debtor's support or the support of a 
dependant or for the operation, preservation, or continuation of the 
Debtor's business . . . . [If not,] the inquiry ends; the debt is dischargeable. 
However, if the debtor does have the ability to pay the debt at issue, the 
Court must then weigh the benefit to the debtor of discharging such debt 
against the detriment to the nondebtor spouse or child of 
nonpayment . . . . If the benefit to the debtor outweighs the detriment to 
the nondebtor spouse or child, the debt is dischargeable.” In re Soforenko 
203 B.R. 853 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (citations omitted). 
152 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2009). 





                                                
Just like in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) cases, there is no 
requirement that an adversary proceeding be filed, so debtors 
are not able to discharge debts that fit into § 523(a)(15) based 
on a failure of the creditor to object.153 This section was 
originally treated as only applying to property settlements, 
but with the BAPCPA changes, the provision need not be 
read so narrowly.154 As the plain language of the statute 
states, it applies to all divorce-related debt not described in 
§ 523(a)(5).155 The only difference is § 523(a)(15) debts are 
not excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).156 
This is due to a logical inconsistency in the Code, and is 
considered in the next subsection.157 
Some courts have already found attorney fees in Chapter 
7 cases to apply under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). For example, 
in a case where the divorce decree awarded only a share of 
the marital property to the non-debtor spouse, the attorney 
fees were held non-dischargeable.158 Another court found 
attorney fees to be non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(15), 
even though a portion of the debt owed was for a child 
support obligation that was non-dischargeable under 
§ 523(a)(5).159 In that case, the court held it did not have to 
determine whether obligations imposed were in the nature of 
support or property settlements, because the distinction 
served no practical purpose.160 The court held that child 
support arrearage was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(5), 
 
153 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2009). See supra note 135. 
154 In re Johnson, No. 07-5054, 2007 WL 3129951, 3 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2007) (“The plain language of the statute now provides that all debts 
which do not qualify as domestic support obligations are 
nondischargeable.”). 
155 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2009). 
156 See, 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2009) text, infra, at Section III.C.2. 
157 See, infra, Section III.C.2. 
158 In re Cunningham, 2008 WL 6192259, 3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008) 
(slip opinion). 
159 In re Golio, 393 B.R. 56, 63 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
160 Id. at 62 (“[T]his Court need not make a determination on whether 
the amounts awarded under the Judgements at issue constitute domestic 
support obligations under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) if the Plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the Judgments would be nondischargeable in any event 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) . . . .”). 
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and without clearly elaborating its reasons why, the court 
then found the judgment for the attorney fees in the state 
court proceedings to be non-dischargeable under  
§ 523(a)(15).161  
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) in Chapter 7 cases, just like 
with a § 523(a)(5) debt, 162 the attorney can still proceed with 
collection activity against non-exempt property of the debtor 
once the debtor is out of bankruptcy. While, the attorney 
won’t have the potential to avoid the automatic stay, or raid 
the debtor’s exempt property during the bankruptcy process, 
as she might be able to as a DSO,163 the marital practitioner is 
provided a level of security for fees. This should help quell 
the policy concerns of those who fear that if attorney fees are 
not DSOs then a dependent spouse may not receive adequate 
counsel. But what about Chapter 13 cases discharged under 
§ 1328(a)? 
 
ii. Chapter 13 Contingency 
 
Unlike a DSO, a § 523(a)(15) debt may be discharged in 
Chapter 13 cases.164 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), which lists non-
dischargeable debts, omits 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) debts from 
the list.165 This is a logical inconsistency that Congress needs 
to fix. This leaves courts with the unappetizing choice 
between finding attorney fees to be DSOs in Chapter 13 cases 
 
161 Id. at 63. 
162 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) excludes allowed 523 exceptions from 
discharge. Non-discharged debts remain actionable after the bankruptcy 
case is discharged. 
163 See discussion, supra, at Section I.C. regarding the automatic stay 
and exemptions. 
164 James L Musselman, Once Upon a Time in Bankruptcy Court: 
Sorting Out Liability of Marital Property for Marital Debt Is No Fairy 
Tale, 41 FAM. L. Q. 249, 270–71 (2007). 
165 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2009). Debts owed under § 523(a)(15) differ 
in Chapter 13 from DSOs in another way, the failure of the debtor to pay 
DSOs that become due after a Chapter 13 petition is filed is cause for a 
Chapter 13 case to be converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1307(c)(11) (2009).  





                                                
or treating them as dischargeable non-support obligations. 
However, this flaw is minimized because so few bankruptcies 
are actually discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).166 Section 
1328(a) provides: 
 
“(a) . . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all 
debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 
502 of this title, except any debt –  
      . . . .  
(2) of the kind specified in section 507 (a)(8)(C) or in 
paragraph (1)(B), (1)(C), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), or (9) 
of section 523 (a); . . . .” 
 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) is noticeably, and illogically 
excluded from this list. Non-support divorce-related debts are 
non-dischargeable in Chapter 7 cases, and also under 
§ 1328(b), which is the hardship discharge under Chapter 
13.167 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c) provides: 
 
“(c) A discharge granted under subsection (b) of this section 
discharges the debtor from all unsecured debts provided for 
by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title, 
except any debt –  
. . . . 
 (2) of a kind specified in section 523 (a) of this title.” 
 
This inconsistency between Code sections makes little 
sense and should be corrected by Congress.  
 
166 Based on the Federal Judiciary Bankruptcy Statistics, which states 
that only thirty percent of bankruptcies are historically filed as Chapter 13 
cases, and of these only one-third of Chapter 13 cases are discharged, or 
roughly ten percent of the whole. See, infra, page 30 and notes 167–68. 
167 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2009). 
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In the meantime, the number of bankruptcies falling into 
this inconsistency are very limited. Of the roughly one 
million Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 consumer bankruptcies 
filed in 2008, a little over thirty percent were filed under 
Chapter 13.168 Since historically only one-third of Chapter 13 
bankruptcies are discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a),169 it 
means that roughly only ten percent of consumer bankruptcy 
cases will fall under § 1328(a). Thus, the vast majority of 
divorce-related claims involving attorney fees fall cleanly 
into the 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) exception.  
In the small minority of cases that remain, the courts 
would be left with two choices, treat the debt as a non-
dischargeable support and give the attorney a set of keys to 
the domestic support kingdom, or find the debt as a 
§ 523(a)(15) and risk discharge. If the court chooses the latter 
course, the attorney fees would only be dischargeable after 
the debtor finished his payment period of three to five 
years.170 As a result, in many of these Chapter 13 cases, the 
attorney would receive at least some of the money owed by 
the debtor. In any case, under Chapter 13, the attorney would 
be no worse off than any other practitioner seeking to collect 
fees from a consumer debtor in bankruptcy. Of course, this 
leaves open the possibility that the spouse or former spouse 
could still remain liable on whatever debt remained. As stated 
before, because neither of the solutions is appealing, 
 
168 Raw numbers from Federal Judiciary Bankruptcy Statistics, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/Bankrup
tcyFilings/2008/1208_f2.xls (last visited June 17, 2010). All calculations 
are the author’s interpretation of those numbers. 
169 “Chapter 13 filing rates remain relatively stable over time at about 
30% of total filings. Completion rates hover nationally at about one-third 
of confirmed plans . . . .” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Bankruptcy by                
the Numbers, http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/ 
abi082000ch13.htm (last visited June 17, 2010). These are albeit rough 
and less than scientific calculations, but if thirty percent of consumer 
bankruptcies are Chapter 13 filings, and of those confirmed plans only 
one-third are completed, then the author calculates that roughly ten 
percent of consumer bankruptcies are discharged under Chapter 13.  
170 Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan requires the debtor to use all 
disposable income for the three to five year duration of the plan to pay off 
debts. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2009). 





                                                





While some believe BAPCPA was directed in part to 
limit the effectiveness of bankruptcy attorneys,171 if 
interpreted too broadly it may have created an unexpected 
boon for domestic relations practitioners. If courts continue to 
find that attorney fees are DSOs, as it seems the majority of 
courts want to do, then enterprising firms may try to use the 
apparently expansive language of BAPCPA to get their claws 
into estate and exempt property. 
Allowing all marital attorney fees awarded against the 
debtor to be treated as DSOs could give divorce lawyers 
unprecedented access to the bankruptcy estate, hindering the 
debtor’s “fresh start” without necessarily helping in 
supporting the spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor. 
This need not occur. In ninety percent of cases, attorney fees 
owed to the spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor 
upon which the spouse, former spouse, or child remains 
liable, can be held as exempt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523 (a)(15),172 thus enhancing the promise of payment for 
the attorney, without turning a payment that goes into an 
attorney’s pocket into a domestic support obligation.  
 
171 See generally, Catherine E. Vance & Corinne Cooper, Nine Traps 
and One Slap: Attorney Liability Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 283 (2005). 
172 Only roughly ten percent of consumer bankruptcy cases are 
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Often the purpose of assessing opponents’ attorney fees is 
to balance out the payment between parties who are 
economically unequal, where one spouse has a financially 
superior position. But filing for bankruptcy is a clear 
indication of financial insecurity. The underlying domestic 
duty recognized by society in general and codified in the 
various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to support the 
spouse, former, spouse or child must as a policy remain, 
despite the honest but unfortunate debtor’s financial situation. 
But in the majority of divorce cases, there is no similarly 
compelling societal policy argument for the debtor to support 
the attorney of the beneficiary of the domestic support 
obligation. 
